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Abstract
We investigate the extent to which price deviations from fundamental values in an exper-
imental asset market are due to the uncertainty of subjects regarding others' rationality. We
do so by comparing the price forecasts submitted by subjects in two market environments: (a)
all six traders are human subjects (6H), and (b) one human subject interacts with ¯ve pro¯t-
maximizing computer traders who assume all the traders are also maximizing pro¯t (1H5C).
The subjects are told explicitly about the behavioral assumption of the computer traders (in
both 6H and 1H5C) as well as which environment they are in. Results from our experiments
show that there is no signi¯cant di®erence between the distributions of the initial deviations of
the forecast prices from the fundamental values in the two markets. However, as subjects learn
by observing the realized prices, the magnitude of deviations becomes signi¯cantly smaller in
1H5C than in 6H markets. We also conduct additional experiments where subjects who have
experienced the 1H5C market interact with ¯ve inexperienced subjects. The price forecasts
initially submitted by the experienced subjects follow the fundamental value despite the fact
that the subjects are explicitly told that the ¯ve other traders in the market are inexperienced
subjects. These ¯ndings do not support the hypothesis that uncertainty about others' rational-
ity plays a major role in causing substantial deviation of forecast prices from the fundamental
values in these asset market experiments.
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1 Introduction
Consider an asset with a ¯nite life of T periods. Each unit of the asset pays a constant dividend
D at the end of each period, and becomes worthless after the ¯nal dividend payment at the end
of period T . Under these conditions, the fundamental value of a unit of the asset during period
t (t = 1; 2; :::; T ), FVt, is the sum of the remaining dividend payments, i.e., FVt = (T + 1 ¡ t)D.
When these conditions are commonly known, the common knowledge of rationality (thus, backward
induction) implies that rational traders will trade this asset, if at all, only at its fundamental value.
Following the seminal study by Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988), it has been repeatedly
shown, for a variety of experimental conditions and subject pools, that the market prices of assets
deviate substantially from their fundamental values in these experimental asset markets.1
Such deviations of observed prices from fundamental values have been considered to result from
the lack of common knowledge of rationality. For example, an interpretation put forward by Smith,
Suchanek, and Williams (1988, p.1148) is as follows: \What we learn from the particular experiments
reported here is that a common dividend, and common knowledge thereof, is insu±cient to induce
initial common expectations. As we interpret it, this is due to agent uncertainty about the behavior
of others." In other words, as noted by Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001, p.832), \traders are uncertain
that future prices will track the fundamental value, because they doubt the rationality of the other
1In the original experiment in Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988), the value of the dividend payment in
each period, dt, was determined randomly from a known i.i.d. distribution. Thus, the fundamental value of the
asset was FVt =
PT
p=t E(dt) where E(dt) is the expected dividend payment. Porter and Smith (1995) eliminates
the uncertainty about dividend payments to investigate the e®ect of varying degrees of risk aversion among subjects.
They did not ¯nd a signi¯cant di®erence in the observed pattern of mispricing from the model with uncertain dividend
payments. While most of the studies, including Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988), consider continuous double
auction markets, van Boening, Williams, and LaMaster (1993) and Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair (2007) consider
call markets. They report that prices deviate substantially from the fundamental values in call markets also. King,
Smith, Williams, and van Boening (1993) investigate the e®ects of short-selling, margin-buying, equal endowment,
and circuit breakers. They also conduct experiments with corporate executives and stock market dealers to see the
e®ect of di®erent subject pools. \Bubbles" and \crashes" were observed in most of their experiment, except in those
where transaction fees were introduced, or where subjects had experienced the same market conditions twice. Haruvy
and Noussair (2006) show that allowing short-selling can cause prices to deviate substantially below the fundamental
values. Noussair, Robin, and Ru±eux (2001) report bubbles in markets with a constant fundamental price, i.e., the
expected value of the per period dividend is zero, and an asset is converted into a ¯xed sum of money at the end of the
¯nal trading period. Dufwenberg, Lindqvist, and Moore (2005) mix the twice-experienced subjects and inexperienced
subjects to investigate whether the presence of inexperienced subjects among experienced subjects induces greater
price deviation. They show that presence of two (respectively four) inexperienced subjects in the market with four
(resp. two) experienced subjects (who have experienced the same market three times) did not produce larger price
deviations than the market with six twice-experienced subjects. Hussam, Porter, and Smith (2008) study whether
(twice) experienced subjects, when facing a new market environment with a large variance in dividend payments and
higher initial cash holdings, would avoid creating bubbles. The answer was negative, so learning to trade close to the
fundamental values in one market condition did not carry over to a di®erent market condition. Deck, Porter, and
Smith (2011) consider overlapping generations of traders to study the e®ect of the arrival of inexperienced traders
and the departure of experienced traders. They ¯nd that bubbles form when inexperienced traders arrive and bring
liquidity to the market, and that crashes occur when experienced traders leave and withdraw liquidity from the
market. See StÄockl, Huber, and Kirchler (2010) and references therein for other experiments.
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traders." Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001) elaborate on this further, stating that \(subjects) speculate
in the belief that there are opportunities for future capital gains" and such speculations result in
observed price deviations from the fundamental values.
To test this \speculative hypothesis," Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001) perform a set of exper-
iments in which capital gains are not possible. Based on the observed deviations of prices from
the fundamental values even in the absence of possibilities of capital gain, Lei, Noussair, and Plott
(2001) reject the speculative hypothesis and conclude that it is not the lack of common knowledge of
rationality but individual bounded rationality of some subjects that causes bubbles and crashes in
these experimental markets.2 Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001, p. 857) note that \the hypothesis that
the traders are rational, and that the bubble is due to the fact that this rationality is not common
knowledge, cannot be the whole story behind the bubbles." The study, however, is silent about the
extent to which individual bounded rationality and uncertainty about others' rationality play a role
in generating mispricing in these experiments.
Two recent papers, Huber and Kirchler (2012) and Kirchler, Huber, and StÄockl (2012), suggest
that these bubbles are mainly due to subjects not understanding the nature of declining fundamental
values of the asset in the experiment. These studies show that the magnitude of mispricing, the
deviation of prices from the fundamental values, becomes much smaller if the instruction shows
a ¯gure of declining fundamental values to the subjects, rather than a table containing the same
information (Huber and Kirchler, 2012), or if the word \stock" (the value of which many subjects
assume not to decline constantly) is explained as \stock is a depletable gold mine" (Kirchler, Huber,
and StÄockl, 2012). The latter also suggests that mispricing due to such confusion is further fueled,
thus resulting in bubbles and crashes, by increasing the cash-asset ratio during the experiment due
to dividend payments. While these two papers make strong cases for the argument that reducing
individual confusion makes the magnitude of mispricing smaller, they remain silent about the extent
to which uncertainty about others' rationality plays a role in these experiments. We note that
subjects better understanding the nature of the experiment does not mean that all subjects believe all
the other subjects understand it better. Thus the relevance of uncertainty about others' rationality
in these experiments still remains an open question.3
2Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001) also suggest that subjects in these experiments who are trained to engage in
trading simply want to trade because there are no other activities available for them during the experiment. Lei,
Noussair, and Plott (2001) call this the \active participation hypothesis."
3Recent developments in experimental game theory demonstrate heterogeneity in the depth of strategic thinking
by subjects (Nagel, 1995; Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt, 1998; Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006). The theoretical
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In this paper, we address this open question by eliminating uncertainty about the rationality of
other traders in the market through introduction of computer traders. We assume that the computer
traders (a) maximize their expected pro¯t without making any error under the assumption that all
the other traders do the same, and (b) prefer to trade when they are indi®erent between trading and
not trading. These assumptions regarding computer traders are explained to all the subjects. We
consider two types of markets (treatments) consisting of six traders: one human and ¯ve computers
(1H5C) and six humans (6H). Our subjects are also told which treatment they are in, so that, in the
1H5C treatment, the unique human trader does not face any uncertainty about the other traders'
rationality.
To facilitate the introduction of computer traders, we employ a call market rule similar to those
used by van Boening, Williams, and LaMaster (1993) and Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair (2007)
rather than the continuous double auction employed by Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) and
in various other studies.4 Notice that, in the absence of any explicit transaction fees (which is the
case in our experiment), our computer traders will submit all their orders (both buy and sell orders)
at the fundamental value in each period. This means that the market prices in 1H5C will follow
the fundamental values very closely. Thus, comparing the realized market prices between the two
treatments, 6H and 1H5C, is not very informative for our purposes. Therefore, we elicit subjects'
expectation about future prices as in Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair (2007). It has been shown that
expected future prices deviate quite substantially from the fundamental values in all human markets
(Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair, 2007, Fig.3, p.1909), and that the deviations disappear gradually as
subjects gain more experience from trading under the same market conditions. This is similar to
what is observed from the realized prices. Thus, our focus on the forecast prices is informative for
studying the cause of realized price deviation.
We next discuss how our design allows us to identify the e®ect of uncertainty about others'
developments that have followed these experimental ¯ndings suggest that considering interaction among heterogeneous
boundedly rational agents helps us to better understand experimental outcomes. See Camerer (2003, Ch.5) and
Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri (2012) for more detail. The way that irrationality or limited rationality at
the individual level in°uences the aggregate outcome depends on the nature of strategic interaction because of how
sophisticated subjects act by taking the existence of such boundedly rational agents into account. The importance
of the nature of strategic interaction has been pointed out theoretically by Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985) and
Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989), and demonstrated experimentally by Fehr and Tyran (2008) in price setting games,
by Sutan and Willinger (2009) in beauty contest games, and by Heemeijer, Hommes, Sonnemans, and Tuinstra (2009)
and Bao, Hommes, Sonnemans, and Tuinstra (2012) in price forecasting experiments. These experimental results
show that in the presence of strategic substitution or negative feedback, the observed outcomes are much closer to the
rationally expected equilibrium while in the presence of strategic complementarity or positive feedback, the outcomes
deviate substantially from this equilibrium.
4van Boening, Williams, and LaMaster (1993) and Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair (2007) report that prices deviate
substantially from fundamental values in call markets as well.
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rationality in the market. Let us imagine a rational human trader. In the 1H5C treatment, s/he
does not face any uncertainty regarding the rationality of the other traders in the market. Thus s/he
will anticipate the prices to follow the fundamental values. Therefore, if we observe any deviation
from this expectation in our data, it must be due to individual bounded rationality (or confusion).
On the contrary, in the 6H treatment, the rational human trader is not sure about the rationality
of the other traders in the market and can expect a variety of outcomes including the possibility
of capital gains. Of course, we should not eliminate the possibility that subjects are confused or
boundedly rational. Thus, the observed deviations of price forecasts from the fundamental values
in the 6H treatment are due to both uncertainty about others' rationality and individual bounded
rationality (or confusion). Thus, a comparison of subjects' price expectations in the 1H5C and 6H
treatments gives us a direct measure of the extent to which uncertainty about the rationality of
others explains the deviation of price forecasts from the fundamental values.
Several experiments have introduced computer agents who follow equilibrium behavior in lab-
oratory experiments to reduce uncertainty regarding the rationality of other players.5 Cason and
Friedman (1997), in their experiments of price formation in a simple market institution,6 introduce
robot traders who follow a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategy to facilitate learning by human sub-
jects.7 Fehr and Tyran (2001), which is also discussed in Fehr and Tyran (2005), introduce robots
that play the Nash equilibrium strategy in their investigation of nominal (money) illusion to decom-
pose the reason for non-immediate adjustment against negative nominal shocks into (i) those coming
from individual irrationality, and (ii) those due to a lack of common knowledge of rationality. Fehr
and Tyran (2001) consider price-setting games and vary two aspects of the game: (a) whether or
not negative nominal shocks are present, and (b) whether a human subject plays the game with
other human subjects or rational computer programs that assume all the players are rational. This
two-by-two design allows them to achieve the objective of the experiments. They report that both
individual irrationality and lack of common knowledge of rationality equally accounted for the failure
5Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) introduce, in addition to rational robots that follow the equilibrium strategy,
boundedly rational robots that follow Level-1,2,3 or Dominance 1,2 strategies in their experiments of a two-person
guessing game to better analyze the responses of human subjects who are informed about the behavioral rules of
various opponents.
6Cason and Friedman (1997) do not consider markets for assets with a life of several periods as we do in this paper.
7It should be noted that when human subjects play against other human subjects who are also learning, the
learning process can be very slow. In addition to robots that follow the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategy (BNE
robots), Cason and Friedman (1997) also introduce \Revealing robots" whose behavior is di®erent from BNE robots
to investigate whether the convergence to the equilibrium is due to human subjects mimicking the behavior of the
BNE robots or due to the best responses against the BNE robots. Their results suggest the latter.
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of immediate adjustment to the new equilibrium after a negative nominal shock in the game.8
Our experimental results suggest that eliminating uncertainty about the rationality of other
traders by introducing pro¯t-maximizing computer traders (who also assume the others behave the
same) does not make subjects forecast the prices to follow the fundamental values from the beginning
of the experiment. In fact, our experiments show that the deviations of the initial price forecasts
from the fundamental values in the 6H and 1H5C treatments are not signi¯cantly di®erent. After
several periods, however, the forecast deviations from the fundamental values become signi¯cantly
smaller in the 1H5C treatment than in the 6H treatment. This dynamic can be understood easily
from the fact that realized prices follow the fundamental values in the 1H5C treatment while, in the
6H treatment, prices deviate substantially from the fundamental values.
In addition to these two treatments, we consider a treatment with one subject who has expe-
rienced the 1H5C treatment and ¯ve other inexperienced subjects who have never participated in
similar experiments (1EH5H, where EH (H) indicates experienced (inexperienced) human subjects).
The subjects are told explicitly, as in the other cases, the composition of the six traders in their
markets. The experienced subjects (EHs) have learned, during their earlier participation in 1H5C
treatment, that the prices follow the fundamental values if they interact with ¯ve computer traders,
and have adjusted their forecasts accordingly. We hypothesize that, if the uncertainty about others'
rationality has a signi¯cant e®ect on how subjects form their expectations about future prices, the
initial price forecasts by EHs, who are informed that the other ¯ve traders are inexperienced human
subjects, should deviate from the fundamental values. Contrary to our expectation, we did not ¯nd
such initial deviations. Most of the EHs in our experiment initially forecasted prices to follow the
fundamental values exactly. After observing that the realized price deviates from the fundamental
values, however, our experienced subjects began to expect this deviation.
These results do not support the hypothesis that uncertainty about others' rationality plays a
signi¯cant role in driving price expectations away from the fundamental values in these asset market
experiments. In addition, the way price forecasts evolve for experienced subjects in the 1EH5H
treatment is consistent with the claim that expectations are adaptive and are driven by the patterns
of price changes observed by the subjects, as previously reported by Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair
8Noussair, Richter, and Tyran (2012) study the e®ect of nominal shocks in experimental asset markets with constant
fundamental values (Noussair, Robin, and Ru±eux, 2001) by changing, in the middle of experiment, the exchange
rate between the experimental currency unit and the real currency with which subjects are paid. Noussair, Richter,
and Tyran (2012) found that while it took a long time for the price to adjust to the new real fundamental value after
a de°ationary nominal shock, the same adjustment was immediate after an in°ationary nominal shock.
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(2007) in a similar experiment (but only with human subjects), and Anufriev and Hommes (2012)
and Bao, Hommes, Sonnemans, and Tuinstra (2012) for another class of experiments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The experimental design is discussed in detail in
Section 2. Section 3 presents the results of our experiments, and Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Experimental design
We set up an experimental asset market consisting of six traders, who can be either human subjects
or computer programs. We consider two treatments. In one treatment, all six traders are human
subjects (6H treatment). In the other treatment, only one of the six traders is a human subject, and
the other ¯ve traders are computer traders who try to maximize their pro¯ts without making any
mistakes while assuming that all the other traders are doing the same (1H5C treatment). In each
treatment, subjects were told explicitly about the composition of six traders in the market they are
participating in, as well as the pro¯t maximizing assumptions of the computer traders.9 Our main
interest lies in comparing the data between these two treatments to separate the e®ect of individual
bounded rationality or confusion and the uncertainty about others' rationality.
As noted in the introduction, we also conducted an additional set of experiments in which
a subject who had participated in the 1H5C treatment interacts with ¯ve inexperienced human
subjects (1EH5H) for a further within-subject investigation. In these experiments, as in the other
treatments, the subjects are told about the behavioral assumption of computer traders as well as
the exact composition the six traders in their group (that one trader has participated in the 1H5C
treatment while the other ¯ve traders have never participated in a similar experiment).
In each market, traders could trade an asset with a life of ten periods. Initially, all traders
are endowed with 2 units of asset and 260 units of experimental currency unit (ECU, which was
called Mark). Subjects are also asked to submit their expectations regarding the future prices of a
unit of the asset. We ¯rst describe the trading rule employed, and then proceed to how subjects'
expectations about future prices were elicited.
9That is, we explain the assumptions about computer traders to the subjects who participate in the 6H treatment
as well. The English translation of the exact statement we use to explain the behavior of computer traders is as
follows: \Each computer trader assumes that all the traders maximize their pro¯ts without making any mistakes.
Given this assumption about the others, the computer trader maximizes his pro¯ts without making mistakes. If the
computer trader is indi®erent between trading and not trading, he prefers to trade." In our experiment, this means
that computer traders submit orders at fundamental values in each period respecting the budget constraint explained
below. We did not tell subjects that computer traders submit their orders at FVs to avoid that trading strategy
becoming the focal strategy and being followed by subjects from the beginning.
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We use a call market rule that is similar to the one in Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair (2007). In
each period, each trader can submit at most one buy order and one sell order.10 An order consists of
a pair of a price and a quantity. When submitting a buy order, a trader must specify the maximum
price, PD, at which s/he is willing to buy a unit of asset, and the maximum quantity, QD, s/he
is willing to buy. In the same manner, when submitting a sell order, a trader must specify the
minimum price, PS, at which s/he is willing to sell a unit of asset, and the maximum quantity,
QS, s/he is willing to sell. We introduce three constraints: the admissible price range, the budget
constraint, and a minimum rationality constraint. The admissible price range is set so that, when
QD ¸ 1 (QS ¸ 1), PD (PS) must be an integer between 1 and 600, i.e., PD 2 f1; 2; :::; 600g
(PS 2 f1; 2; :::; 600g). The budget constraint here simply means that neither borrowing of cash
nor short-selling of an asset is allowed.11 The minimum rationality constraint means that, when a
trader is submitting both buy and sell orders, i.e., QD ¸ 1 and QS ¸ 1, the maximum buying price
must be no greater than the minimum selling price, i.e., PS ¸ PD. Once all the traders in the
market have submitted their orders, the computer calculates the price that clears the market,12 and
all transactions take place at that price among traders who submitted a maximum buying price no
less than, or a minimum selling price no greater than, the market clearing price.13 If no price exists
that allows positive transactions, no transaction takes place. We give the market clearing price as
zero in the case of no transaction.
At the end of each period, a unit of the asset pays 12 ECU as a dividend. We have chosen a
certain dividend payment, instead of a stochastic dividend as commonly considered in the literature,
to eliminate the possible e®ects that varying degrees of risk aversion among traders may have on the
experimental outcome.14 The dividend can be used to purchase the asset in the following periods.
After the ¯nal dividend is paid at the end of period 10, the asset has no value. Other than this
stream of dividend payments, the asset has no intrinsic value. Thus the fundamental value of a unit
of asset at the beginning of period t is FVt = 12 £ (11 ¡ t).15 We next explain how expectation
10Of course, a trader is allowed to not submit any orders by specifying the quantities to both buy and sell as zero.
There is a 60 second, non-binding, time limit, in submitting orders. When the time limit is reached, the subjects
were simply told, though a °ashing message in the upper right corner of their screen, to submit their orders as soon
as possible.
11Thus the budget constraint implies (i) QD £ PD · cash holding at the beginning of the period, and (ii) QS ·
units of asset on hand at the beginning of the period.
12When there are several such prices, the average price which is rounded down to an integer is chosen as the market
clearing price
13Any ties among the last accepted buy or sell orders are broken randomly.
14Porter and Smith (1995) show that eliminating uncertainty about the dividend payments did not signi¯cantly
lower the magnitude of price deviations from the fundamental values.
15We distributed a table showing the sum of the remaining dividends after the dividend for each period was paid
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about future prices was elicited.
At the beginning of each period, subjects were asked to submit their price forecasts for all the
remaining periods of the market. That is, in period t, each subject submitted 10¡ t+1 forecasts.16
Therefore, subjects are submitting a total of 55 price forecasts over the 10 periods. Each price
forecast can be an integer value between 0 and 600, where 0 represents forecasting no transaction.
Subjects were told that they would receive the following bonus payments according to how accurate
their forecast prices were:
Bonus (in ECU) =0:5%£ ( Number of forecasts that were within § 10 % of the actual market price )
£ Final cash holding in period 10:
Therefore, if all 55 forecasts were within 10% of the realized prices, the subject could receive 27.5%
of his/her ¯nal cash holding as a bonus payment.17 This incentive scheme for accurate forecasts
was chosen to reduce subjects' incentive to in°uencing the prices to move closer to their forecasts
by making losses.18 When submitting price forecasts, all previous market clearing prices are shown
on the screen. Our design is closely related to that used by Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair (2007),
who showed substantial deviation of both realized price and price forecasts from the fundamental
values.19
The call market rule has several advantages: (i) the prices subjects have to forecast are clear,
(2) learning based on observing orders submitted by other traders within a period is not possible,
(3) it is easier to introduce computer traders because all orders are submitted simultaneously, and
out, the value we called \next value" in the experiment. Thus subjects had a table showing FVt for t = 2; :::; 10. We
also conducted sessions where subjects were given a ¯gure showing the next values in addition to the table. In the
session with the ¯gure showing the declining next value, we conducted a control quiz to test the understanding of
the subjects at the end of the instruction. Our measure of the deviations of forecasted prices from the fundamental
values were not statistically di®erent, unlike the magnitude of price deviations reported by Huber and Kirchler (2012),
between sessions with and without the ¯gure showing the declining fundamental value. See the appendix for details.
16There was a 120 second, non-binding, time limit for submitting price forecasts. When the time limit was reached,
the subjects were simply told, through a message °ashing in the upper right corner of their screen, to submit their
forecasts as soon as possible.
17Therefore, if a subject forecasts that there will be no transaction, there must indeed be no transaction for the
subject to receive the 0.5% bonus.
18As noted by Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair (2007), there is a trade-o® between an incentive for accurate transactions
and an incentive for maximizing pro¯t from trading. That is, because we ask subjects to submit their forecasts before
submitting their order, it is possible that when the incentive for accurate forecasts is too strong, subjects submit
potentially loss-making orders to in°uence the prices to be closer to their forecasts. In our design, since the bonus for
accurate forecasts is a fraction of the ¯nal cash holding, this incentive will be reduced. It is, of course, best to have
both accurate forecasts and high pro¯t from trading.
19Huber and Kirchler (2012) report that asking subjects about what the fundamental value of the asset will be in
the next period can signi¯cantly reduce deviations of the realized price from the fundamental value in an experimental
asset market under continuous double auction.
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(4) because all subjects submit their order once in each period, the possible e®ect of the \active
participation hypothesis" (Lei, Noussair, and Plott, 2001) is reduced.20
As the end of each period, subjects are informed about the market clearing price for the period,
the units of asset they have traded,21 their cash and asset holdings, the (total) number of price
forecasts that were within 10% of actual market prices up to that period, and the next value of a
unit of the asset.22
As noted above, each trader is given an endowment of 260 ECU of cash and two units of the asset
before the market opens in period 1. The same group of traders, with identical initial endowment
of cash and the asset, repeat the same 10-period market three times in one experiment. We call a
10-period market a round. Thus, the experiment consists of 3 rounds of a 10-period market with
identical initial endowments and the same group of subjects. The purpose of repeating the round
three time is to compare how quickly the price forecasts and the market clearing prices converge to
the fundamental values.23
At the end of the experiment (after participating in 3 rounds of a 10-period market), subjects
were paid in cash according to the sum of their ¯nal cash holdings (including a bonus payment for
accurately predicting future market prices) for each round, plus a participation fee of 500 yen. The
exchange rate between ECU and Japanese yen was 1 ECU = 2 Japanese yen. The experiment lasted
about two and a half hours including the instruction and a questionnaire after the experiment.
3 Results
The set of computerized experiment was conducted at the University of Tsukuba.24 226 subjects were
recruited from across the campus by e-mails and °yers.25 Most of the subjects were undergraduate
students, while 11 were graduate students. Fifty-three of the 226 subjects were from the College of
Policy and Planning Sciences (CPPS) in which Economics is one of the majors.26 Table 1 summarizes
20According to the active participation hypothesis, subjects may engage in loss-generating trades rather than not
trading because they have no other activity during the experiments.
21This information was shown so that a positive (resp. negative) number meant that they had bought (resp. sold)
a certain number of units of asset.
22The next value of an asset at the end of period t is 12£ (10¡ t).
23Before entering round 1, there was a practice period to allow subjects to familiarize themselves with the user
interface of the software. Subjects were given their initial endowment of cash and asset, and asked to enter their price
forecasts for 10 periods and their orders for period 1. The information regarding the resulting market clearing price
and so on were not shown to the subjects.
24The experiments are implemented with z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
25Of these 226 subjects, 16 participated in the experiment twice, ¯rst in 1H5C and second in 1EH5H as the EH.
26We are not able to identify their major.
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Treatment Number of Subjects CPPS Date
1H5C 8 2 June 3, 2012 (AM)
6H 24 16 June 3, 2012 (AM)
1EH 5H 48 (8 as EH) 14 (2 as EH) June 3, 2012 (PM)
1H5C 17 3 July 7, 2012 (AM)
6H 24 3 July 7, 2012 (AM)
1EH 5H 48 (8 as EH) 6 July 7, 2012 (PM)
1H5C 25 5 Sep. 22, 2012 (AM + PM)
6H 48 4 Sep. 22, 2012 (AM + PM)
Table 1: Summary of experimental sessions. 1EH 5H: subjects who participated in the 1H5C session
in the morning (AM) were recruited to interact with inexperienced subjects in the afternoon (PM)
the same day. CPPS indicates the number of subjects from the College of Policy and Planning
Sciences.
the experimental sessions.
In this section, we ¯rst discuss the price forecasts and their deviation from the fundamental
values in the 1H5C and 6H treatments. We then move on to discussing the results from the 1EH5H
treatments.
3.1 1H5C vs. 6H
Figure 1 shows the initial (i.e., from period 1 of round 1) deviation of the forecast prices from the
fundamental values for each subject in 1H5C (left) and 6H (right). There are 50 subjects in 1H5C
and 96 subjects in 6H. It is obvious from Figure 1 that there are a few subjects, both in 1H5C and
in 6H, whose initial forecast deviations are much larger than those of the others.
In each period, subjects are forecasting prices for all the remaining periods within a round.
To better summarize the magnitude of forecast deviations from the fundamental values for each
subjects, we construct two measures of deviation by applying the measures of price deviations from
the fundamental values, the relative absolute deviation (RAD) and the relative deviation (RD),
proposed by StÄockl, Huber, and Kirchler (2010).
For subject i, the deviation of forecast prices from the fundamental values in period t and round
r are measured by bRADit;r and bRDit;r de¯ned as:
bRADit;r =
1
N ¡ t+ 1
NX
p=t
jf it;p;r ¡ FVpj
jFV j
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Figure 1: Deviations of price forecasts (in period 1, round 1) from the fundamental values over ten
periods for each subject for 1H5C and 6H.
Distribution of initial forecast deviations.
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Figure 2: The cumulative distribution for bRADi1;1 (left) and bRD
i
1;1 (right) for 1H5C and 6H.
Dashed lines: 1H5C. Solid lines: 6H. Number of samples is 50 (1H5C) and 96 (6H).
bRDit;r =
1
N ¡ t+ 1
NX
p=t
f it;p;r ¡ FVp
jFV j ;
where N is the number of periods (N = 10 in our experiment), f it;p;r is the forecast price of the
period p asset price submitted by subject i in period t of round r, FVp is the fundamental value of
the asset in period p, and jFV j is the absolute value of the average fundamental value of the asset
over all periods.27 When subject i, in round r, forecast that no transaction would take place in
period p, we set f it;p;r = FVp so there is no deviation in forecast price from the fundamental value.
28
The only di®erence between bRAD and bRD is the use of the absolute value. As noted by StÄockl,
Huber, and Kirchler (2010), these two measures are complementary in that while bRAD shows the
magnitude of the forecast deviations, bRD shows the direction of these deviations.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the two measures of initial forecast deviations, bRADi1;1 (left)
27We omit the subscript r for FVp, jFV j, and N because they remain constant across all three rounds in our
experiment. One could also consider normalizing the measure using the average fundamental value of the asset over
the remaining periods from period t. We avoid this to keep the denominator constant for all t.
28We also construct bRAD and bRD by dropping the non-transaction forecasts. The results are very similar. See
the appendix.
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Dynamics of median bRADit;1
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Period
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
bRAD
Figure 3: The dynamics of median bRADit; 1 for 1H5C and 6H. Dashed lines: 1H5C. Solid lines: 6H.
and bRDi1;1 (right), for 6H (solid lines) and 1H5C (dashed lines). We do not reject the null hypothesis
that the observed distributions of bRADi1;1 and bRD
i
1;1 for the two treatments are drawn from the
same underlying distribution.29 Thus, we do not observe that uncertainty about others' rationality
has an e®ect on the initial forecast deviations from the fundamental values.
The magnitudes of forecast deviations from the fundamental values, however, become signi¯cantly
smaller in 1H5C than in 6H after several periods of trading. Figure 3 shows the dynamics of median
bRADit;1 (that is, from round 1) for 1H5C (dashed lines) and 6H (solid lines). While the median
bRADit;1 is the same in period 1, it becomes signi¯cantly di®erent by period 4.
30
This di®erence in the dynamics of forecast deviations can be easily understood from the di®erence
in the observed prices in two treatments. While the prices follow the FVs exactly in 1H5C, this is not
the case in 6H. As one can see from Figure 4, not only do the prices deviate from the fundamental
values, there are also a number of cases where no transaction took place in the 6H treatment.
As one would expect from the dynamics of median bRADit;1 between the two treatments, the
distributions of forecasts deviations in period 1 become signi¯cantly di®erent in the later rounds. As
Figure 5 shows, in rounds 2 and 3, the distribution of bRADi1;r (for r = 2; 3) for the 6H treatment lies
to the right of that for the 1H5C treatment. In these two rounds, we reject the null hypothesis that
the observed distribution of bRADi1;r for the two treatments are drawn from the same underlying
distribution.31
29The p-values are 0.817 for bRADi1;1 and 0.558 for bRD
i
1;1 using the two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test.
30The p-value is 0.019 using the two-sided Mann-Whitney (MW) test. It should be noted that because subjects in
the same group (or market) in the 6H treatment observed the same realized prices, they are no longer an independent
sample after period 2 of round 1. Thus, for all the observation after period 2 of round 1, we take the group (market)
level averages and use them as an independent sample in conducting our statistical tests. As can be easily computed
from information in Table 1, there are 16 groups in the 6H treatment. Figure 3 is based on the individual level data.
31For both rounds 2 and 3, the p-value is less that 0.001 using the two-sided KS test. As noted above, the tests are
based on independent samples.
13
Price dynamics in the 6H treatment
Round 1 (r = 1) Round 2 (r = 2) Round 3 (r = 3)
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Figure 4: Price dynamics for three rounds of the 6H treatment for each group. Note that no
transaction is represented by a price of 0.
3.2 1EH5H
Comparing the deviation of the price forecasts from the fundamental values between 6H and 1H5C
led us to conclude that eliminating the uncertainty about the rationality of others does not result in
subjects anticipating the price to more closely follow the fundamental values from the beginning of
the experiment. Many subjects in 1H5C, however, learned to expect the price to follow the funda-
mental values after experiencing the 10-period market once. Did these subjects in 1H5C who learned
to forecast fundamental values understand why the prices follow fundamental values? Namely, did
they learn to forecast prices to follow the fundamental values because they are interacting with
computer programs that maximize pro¯t without making an error while assuming that all the other
traders do the same? Or do they simply expect the same pattern of price dynamics that they have
observed, that of prices following the fundamental values, to be repeated again?
To address this issue, we conducted an additional set of experiments in which a subject who has
participated in the 1H5C treatment is recruited again to interact with ¯ve inexperienced human
subjects (1EH5H). These experienced subjects participated in the 1H5C treatment in the morning,
and recruited back to participate in the 1EH5H treatment in the afternoon of the same day. The
same instructions as in the 1H5C and 6H treatments, except for the ¯nal part that explains the
composition of the traders, are given to all the subjects. Thus experienced subjects have received
the same instruction twice. By round 3 in the 1H5C experiment, the experienced subjects (EH) have
all learned that the prices will follow the fundamental values. If they have reasoned that the observed
price pattern in 1H5C was due to the other ¯ve traders being computer programs that behaved in a
certain way, they may not expect the prices to follow the same pattern after being informed that the
other ¯ve traders are inexperienced human subjects new to this experiment. Thus, if their initial
14
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Figure 5: The cumulative distribution of bRADi1;r (left) and bRD
i
1;r (right) for 1H5C and 6H in
round 2 (top) and round 3 (bottom) Dashed lines: 1H5C. Solid lines: 6H. The number of samples
is 50 (1H5C) and 96 (6H).
price forecasts deviate from the fundamental values in the 1EH5H treatment, these deviations must
be due to their expectations that the inexperienced traders do not behave as computer traders do,
i.e., they are uncertain about others' rationality and behavior.
Figure 6 shows the empirical distribution of bRADi1;1 for experienced subjects. It is clear that
most of the experienced subjects in this treatment initially forecast prices to follow the fundamental
values despite the fact that they were clearly instructed that the other ¯ve traders in their market
are inexperienced subjects.32 This was surprising given how these experienced subjects made their
forecasts initially when participating in the 1H5C treatment just a few hours before. It seems that
after participating in the 1H5C market and observing the prices to follow the fundamental values,
it became natural for them to expect the same outcome regardless of who the other traders were in
the market. This is clearly at odds with the hypothesis that uncertainty about others' rationality
plays a major role in how expectations are formed and how subjects behave in experimental asset
markets.
These experienced subjects, however, quickly revised their price forecasts once they had observed
32Fourteen of the 16 experienced subjects forecast the prices to follow fundamental values. The other two expected
only small deviations.
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Figure 6: The cumulative distribution of bRADi1;1 for experienced subjects in 1EH5H. There are 16
experienced subjects.
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Figure 7: The dynamics of bRADit;1 (left) and bRD
i
t;1 (middle) for experienced subjects (right),
and the dynamics of prices (left) in round 1 of the 1EH5H treatment for each group. Notice that
no-transaction is represented by a price of 0.
the prices to deviate substantially from the fundamental values in this new market with other human
traders, as can be seen from Figure 7. This observation suggests that subjects' expectations are
driven mainly by the observed prices and not by their expectations of the behavior of others in
experimental asset markets.
How about the inexperienced subjects? Does being informed that one of the traders is a subject
who has experienced the same experiment and has traded with computer programs changes their
expectation signi¯cantly compared to the case where all the traders are inexperienced subjects? We
have already shown that being informed that the other ¯ve traders are computer traders does not
result in inexperienced subjects forming signi¯cantly di®erent expectations about future prices, so
we may expect similar outcomes.
Figure 8 shows the empirical distribution of bRADi1;1 (left) and bRD
i
1;1 (right) for inexperienced
subjects from the 1EH5H treatment (solid lines) and the 6H treatment (dashed lines). As can easily
be seen from the ¯gure, there is no statistically signi¯cant di®erence between the distributions of
bRADi1;1 for the 1EH5H and 6H treatments. The same is true for the distribution of bRD
i
1;1.
33
33The p-values are 0.271 for bRAD and 0,706 for bRD using the two-sided KS test.
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Figure 8: The cumulative distribution of bRADi1;1 (left) and bRD
i
1;1 (right) for inexperienced sub-
jects in the 1EH5H treatment (solid lines) and 6H treatment (dashed lines). There are 80 inexperi-
enced subjects in the 1EH5H treatment and 96 subjects in the 6H treatment.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated to what extent the deviation of forecast prices from the fundamen-
tal values in experimental asset markets is caused by individual bounded rationality (or confusion)
and by uncertainty about the rationality of other traders. We have compared the initial, as well
as subsequent, forecast prices submitted by subjects in two market environments - one where all
six traders are human subjects (6H), and the other where one human subject is interacting with
¯ve computer traders who submit orders at the fundamental values (1H5C). Subjects are all told
that computer traders maximize their pro¯t without making mistakes while assuming that all other
traders do the same. They are also clearly informed about the composition of traders in their group.
Our analysis shows that initially there is no signi¯cant di®erence between the deviations of forecasts
from the fundamental values in the 6H and 1H5C markets. Thus, eliminating uncertainty about
other traders' rationality by informing subjects that the other traders are computer traders does not
have a signi¯cant impact on how initial expectations are formed.
Subjects start forecasting the prices to follow the fundamental values in 1H5C after observing this
outcome for several periods. These changes in expected price can be driven by subjects adjusting
their expectation based on the observed price patterns (adaptive expectations) as well as their deeper
understanding of the behavior of computer traders. If the latter is the dominant factor, the subjects
may not expect the prices to follow the fundamental values when they face human traders who have
never participated in similar experiments.
To investigate this issue, we conducted an additional experiment in which one subject who has
participated in the 1H5C treatment (experienced subjects, EH) interacts with ¯ve other inexperi-
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enced subjects (1EH5H). The experienced subjects have learned during their participations in the
1H5C treatment that prices will follow the fundamental values if the other ¯ve traders are com-
puter programs. If these subjects reason that the observed price dynamic in 1H5C is due to the
way computer traders behave, and if they expect inexperienced human traders to behave di®erently,
then they should expect the prices to deviate from the fundamental values in this new experiment.
Contrary to our expectation, 14 of the 16 experienced subjects initially forecast the price to follow
the fundamental values. The other two experienced subjects forecast the prices to deviate only
slightly from the fundamental values. Thus, being informed that all the other traders are inexperi-
enced subjects did not play a signi¯cant role in these experienced subjects forming their initial price
forecasts.
Based on our results, we conclude that uncertainty about the rationality of other traders has no
signi¯cant impact in explaining the initial deviation of price forecasts from the fundamental values.
We, therefore, reinforce the conclusion put forward by Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001), Huber and
Kirchler (2012), and Kirchler, Huber, and StÄockl (2012) that individual bounded rationality (or
confusion) is the main driving force of bubbles in these experiments. This is in sharp contrast with
the signi¯cant e®ect of uncertainty about others' rationality found in game theoretic experiments
such as in Fehr and Tyran (2001), where the nature of strategic interactions are much more salient.
Investigation of potential causes of this sharp di®erence in results may be a fruitful topic for future
research to better understand the results reported here.
After observing that the prices deviate from the fundamental values, however, the experienced
subjects in the 1EH5H treatment adjust their price forecasts to deviate from the fundamental values.
This result, as well as the way expectations evolved in the 1H5C and 6H treatments, are in line
with the ¯nding that expectations are adaptive and are driven by previously observed patterns, as
presented by Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair (2007) for the same type of experiment, and Anufriev and
Hommes (2012) and Bao, Hommes, Sonnemans, and Tuinstra (2012) for other types of experiment.
Our ¯ndings may explain the experimental result reported by Dufwenberg, Lindqvist, and Moore
(2005). Dufwenberg, Lindqvist, and Moore (2005) found no signi¯cant di®erence in the price dy-
namics between markets consisting only of twice-experienced subjects, and those consisting of both
(three times) experienced and inexperienced subjects.34 Given that realized prices demonstrate sub-
34Dufwenberg, Lindqvist, and Moore (2005) uses a continuous double auction between six traders with uncertainty
about dividend payments.
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stantial deviations from the fundamental values even in markets consisting only of twice-experienced
subjects, it is quite possible that these experienced subjects continue to expect the price to follow
a similar pattern even when they were informed of the change in the composition of traders in the
market.35 The results may have been somewhat di®erent if the prices followed the fundamental val-
ues (as in our 1H5C treatment) for the markets consisting only of twice-experienced subjects. Our
result suggests that, if that were the case, then the experienced subjects would expect the prices
to follow the fundamental values, while inexperienced subjects would not. Thus, one would expect
the magnitude of price deviations from the fundamental values to be smaller in a market with more
experienced subjects. Of course, this conjecture needs to be tested experimentally but we leave this
to future research.
35Of course, to see the real impact of the existence of inexperienced subjects, one needs to compare the outcomes
between markets that consist only of three times experienced subjects and the mixed market.
19
Treatment Number of Subjects Date
1H5C+ 11 May 30, 2012 (PM)
6H+ 24 May 30, 2012 (PM)
Table 2: Summary of experimental sessions with instruction including a ¯gure showing declining
fundamental values plus a control quiz at the end of instruction.
Empirical distribution of bRADit;1
1H5C vs. 1H5C+ 6H vs. 6H+
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p-value =0.22 (KS) p-value =0.33 (KS)
Figure 9: The distribution of bRADit;1. Left: 1H5C (solid lines) vs. 1H5C+ (dashed lines). Right:
6H (solid lines) vs. 6H+ (dashed lines). We use data from the June 3rd and July 7th experiments
for 1H5C and 6H so that the same experimenter read the instructions for 1H5C+ and 1H5C as well
as for 6H and 6H+.
A Showing a declining ¯gure for FV.
We ran two experimental sessions where we added a ¯gure showing the fundamental values in
our instruction, and also conducted a control quiz36 to check understanding of the experiment.
Huber and Kirchler (2012) has shown that just showing a ¯gure of fundamental values to subjects
dramatically reduces the magnitude of price deviations from the fundamental values. Our aim was
to check whether this is also the case for the magnitude of initial deviations of forecast prices from
the fundamental values. These extra experimental sessions are summarized in Table 2.
Figure 9 compares bRADi1;1 between the sessions with the ¯gure and the control quiz and the
sessions without either the ¯gure or the control quiz. We call those with the ¯gure and quiz 1H5C+
and 6H+. Thus, our comparisons are between bRADi1;1 for 1H5C+ (dashed lines) and 1H5C (solid
lines), shown in the left panel, and for 6H+ (dashed lines) and 6H (solid lines), shown in the right
panel. We ¯nd no signi¯cant di®erence between two distributions of bRADi1;1 across treatments
(p-values from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test are reported in Figure 9). Therefore, we expect
the main results reported in the text to be very similar even if the ¯gure and quiz were included to
36We based the quiz on that used by Deck, Porter, and Smith (2011) and modi¯ed it to ¯t our purpose. We thank
Cary Deck for sharing their quiz with us.
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further reduce possible confusion.
B Alternative measures of forecasts deviations
We next present results based on alternative measures of forecast deviations from the fundamental
values. In the main text, we set f it;p;r ¡ FVp = 0 whenever f it;p;r = 0 because subjects who forget
that \computer traders prefer to trade when indi®erent between trading and not-trading" may
expect no transaction to take place at the fundamental value. Further, in the 6H treatment, there
were a number of periods where no transaction took place. A possible e®ect this may have is
that the magnitude of forecast deviations becomes small for subjects predicting no transactions.
To ensure that the way we treated no-transaction forecasts is not driving our result, we use an
alternative de¯nition of forecast deviation by dropping no-transaction forecasts in computing the
forecast deviations:
bRAD2it;r =
1
N ¡ t+ 1¡ ntit;r
NX
p=t
¡it;p;rjf it;p;r ¡ FVpj
jFV j ;
where ¡it;p;r is an indicator function that takes the value one when subject i has forecast a transaction
to take place, that is, f it;p;r 6= 0, when submitting his/her forecasts at the beginning of period t in
round r, and is zero otherwise, while ntit;r is the number of periods such that ¡
i
t;p;r = 0. This
measure is not de¯ned for subject i in period t if s/he has forecast that no transaction will take
place in all the remaining periods. This happened mostly in periods 9 and 10 of each round.
As can be seen from comparing Figure 5 in the main text with Figure 10 above, the results are
basically the same, with the distributions of bRAD2 slightly shifted toward the right of those for
bRAD.
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Distribution of bRAD2i1;r
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Figure 10: The distribution of bRAD2i1;r in period 1 across three rounds for 1H5C and 6H. Dashed
lines: 1H5C. Solid lines: 6H.
C Instruction
English translations of the instructions, the script and the slides shown, can be downloaded from:
² http://www.vcharite.univ-mrs.fr/~nobi/assetM/slides.pdf (slides)
² http://www.vcharite.univ-mrs.fr/~nobi/assetM/instructionText.pdf (script read)
² http://www.vcharite.univ-mrs.fr/~nobi/assetM/QuizAndAnswer.pdf (quiz used in 1H5C+ and
6H+)
The set of instructions in Japanese is available upon request.
References
Anufriev, M., and C. Hommes (2012): \Evolutionary selection of individual experctations and
aggregate outcomes in asset pricing experiments," American Economics Journal, Microeconomics,
forthcoming.
Bao, T., C. Hommes, J. Sonnemans, and J. Tuinstra (2012): \Individual expectations, limited
rationality and aggregate outcomes," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 36, 1101{1120.
Camerer, C. F. (2003): Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Russell
Sage Foundation, New York.
Cason, T. N., and D. Friedman (1997): \Price Formation in Single Call Markets," Econometrica,
65(2), 311{345.
22
Costa-Gomes, M. A., and V. P. Crawford (2006): \Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person
Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, 96(5), 1737{1768.
Crawford, V. P., M. A. Costa-Gomes, and N. Iriberri (2012): \Structural Models of
Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications," Journal of Economic
Literature, forthcoming.
Deck, C., D. Porter, and V. Smith (2011): \Double Bubbles in Assets Markets with Multiple
Generations," University of Arkansas and Chapman University.
Dufwenberg, M., T. Lindqvist, and E. Moore (2005): \Bubbles and Experience: An Experi-
ment," American Economic Review, 95, 1731{1737.
Fehr, E., and J.-R. Tyran (2001): \Does Money Illusion Matter?," American Economic Review,
91(5), 1239{1262.
(2005): \Individual Irrationality and Aggregate Outcomes," Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 19, 43{66.
(2008): \Limited Rationality and Strategic Interaction: The Impact of the strategic envi-
ronment on nominal inertia," Econometrica, 76(2), 353{394.
Fischbacher, U. (2007): \z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experi-
mental Economics, 10(2), 171{178.
Haltiwanger, J., and M. Waldman (1985): \Rational Expectations and the Limits of Rational-
ity: An Analysis of Heterogeneity," American Economics Review, 75(3), 326{340.
(1989): \Limited Rationality and Strategic Complements: The implications for macroeco-
nomics," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 463{484.
Haruvy, E., Y. Lahav, and C. N. Noussair (2007): \Traders' Expectations in Asset Markets:
Experimental Evidence," American Economics Review, 97(5), 1901{1920.
Haruvy, E., and C. N. Noussair (2006): \The E®ect of Short Selling on Bubbles and Crashes
in Experimental Spot Asset Markets," Journal of Finance, 61, 1119{1157.
23
Heemeijer, P., C. Hommes, J. Sonnemans, and J. Tuinstra (2009): \Price stability and
volatility in markets with positive and negative expectations feedback: An experimental investi-
gation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 33, 1052{1072.
Ho, T.-H., C. Camerer, and K. Weigelt (1998): \Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Re-
sponse in Experimental \p-Beauty Contests"," American Economic Review, 88(4), 947{969.
Huber, J., and M. Kirchler (2012): \The impact of instructions and procedure on reducing
confusion and bubbles in experimental asset markets," Experimental Economics, 15, 89{105.
Hussam, R. N., D. Porter, and V. L. Smith (2008): \Thar She Blows: Can Bubbles Be
Rekindled with Experienced Subjects?," American Economic Review, 98, 927{934.
King, R. R., V. L. Smith, A. W. Williams, and M. van Boening (1993): \The Robustness of
Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Stock Markets," in Nonlinear Dynamics and Evolutionary
Economics, ed. by R. H. Day, and P. Chen, chap. 13, pp. 183{200. Oxford University Press.
Kirchler, M., J. Huber, and T. StÄockl (2012): \Thar She Bursts: Reducing Confusion Reduces
Bubbles," American Economic Review, 102(2), 865{883.
Lei, V., C. N. Noussair, and C. R. Plott (2001): \Nonspeculative Bubbles in Experimental As-
set Markets: Lack of Common Knowledge of Rationality vs. Actual Irrationality," Econometrica,
69, 831{859.
Nagel, R. (1995): \Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economics
Review, 85(5), 1313{1326.
Noussair, C., S. Robin, and B. Ruffieux (2001): \Price Bubbles in Laboratory Asset Markets
with Constant Fundamental Values," Experimental Economics, 4, 87{105.
Noussair, C. N., G. Richter, and J.-R. Tyran (2012): \Money Illusion and Nominal Inertia
in Experimental Asset Markets," Journal of Behavioral Finance, 13(1), 27{37, Working Paper
2008-29.
Porter, D. P., and V. L. Smith (1995): \Futures Contractinga and Dividend Uncertainty in
Experimental Asset Markets," The Journal of Business, 68(4), 509{541.
24
Smith, V. L., G. L. Suchanek, and A. W. Williams (1988): \Bubbles, Crashes. and Endogenous
Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets," Econometrica, 56, 1119{1151.
StÄockl, T., J. Huber, and M. Kirchler (2010): \Bubble measures in Experimental Asset
Markets," Experimental Economics, 13, 284{298.
Sutan, A., and M. Willinger (2009): \Guessing with negative feedback: An experiment," Jour-
nal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 33, 1123{1133.
van Boening, M. V., A. W. Williams, and S. LaMaster (1993): \Price bubbles and crashes
in experimental call markets," Economics Letters, 41, 179{185.
25
